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Abstract 
The article explores the foundations of conservative trends in Russian politics. The 
manifestation of conservative tendencies is seen in the very nature of the neo-patrimonial 
political regime prevailing in post-Soviet Russia, and in the legitimizing ideology on which 
it is based. The formation of the neopatrimonial regime and its ideological foundations are 
considered as a manifestation of the archaization of Russian society, which also manifests 
itself in the strengthening of the role of religion in Russian society; while religiosity itself 
has a certain specificity, which makes it possible to talk about the presence of archaizing 
tendencies within the framework of religious consciousness. 
Keywords: conservatism, archaization, modernization, public administration, Russian 
society, neopatrimonialism, ideology, religion, culture, Orthodoxy. 
 
Resumen 
El artículo explora los fundamentos de las tendencias conservadoras en la política rusa. La 
manifestación de las tendencias conservadoras se ve en la naturaleza misma del régimen 
político neopatrimonial que prevalece en la Rusia postsoviética y en la ideología 
legitimadora en la que se basa. La formación del régimen neopatrimonial y sus 
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fundamentos ideológicos se consideran una manifestación de la arcaización de la sociedad 
rusa, que también se manifiesta en el fortalecimiento del papel de la religión en la sociedad 
rusa; mientras que la religiosidad misma tiene una cierta especificidad, lo que hace posible 
hablar sobre la presencia de tendencias arcaizantes en el marco de la conciencia religiosa. 
Palabras clave: conservadurismo, arcaización, modernización, administración pública, 




In the post-Soviet period, Russian society and its political system underwent 
noticeable changes. The 90s of the twentieth century, the period immediately following the 
collapse of the USSR, passed under the slogans of the formation of democratic political 
institutions, market economy and the establishment of liberal values. Indeed, during this 
period the institutional foundation for the democratic regime was laid, however, almost 
immediately, democratic forms of governance began to grow into informal practices that 
distort their essence. Development of market economy in Russia was of an equally 
controversial character. The course of the reforms and their results caused dissatisfaction 
among a significant part of Russian society, which perceived these reforms as a reason for 
the deterioration of its socio-economic situation, as well as the reason for the loss of 
Russia's position on the world stage. Discontent naturally stimulated nostalgic moods. The 
difficulties and contradictions of socio-economic and political development were 
accompanied by an increase in anomic tendencies, the atomization of society and the loss 
of collective identity, normative value uncertainty and sociocultural risks [Gafiatulina, et 
al., 2018; Shakbanova, et al., 2018; Shakhbanova, Kasyanov, et al., 2019]. All this served 
as an incentive for the search for new ideological guidelines, the source of which was often 
the idealized past - both Soviet and pre-Soviet, as well as reviving and new religions. The 
political regime that was forming in Russia with increasing distance from the ideals of 
democracy also needed ideological legitimation, which acquired a conservative character 
with a significant religious component. The article examines the specifics of the post-Soviet 
political regime and its conservative nature in the context of the process of archaization of 
Russian society in the post-Soviet period. 
Materials and Methods.  
The general theoretical framework of this article is the concept of modernization, 
both its classic version, and the later concept of the plurality of modernity, which has 
gained popularity in recent years. The classical concept of modernization implies that 
modernity is a universal project, first implemented within the framework of Western 
societies, but later globally spread. Societies that have embarked on the path of 
modernization under the direct or indirect influence of the West are designated as societies 
of secondary or catch-up modernization. Unlike Western modernization, catch-up 
modernization takes place in a historically short time and does not grow out of the organic 
development of society. In the course of catch-up modernization, Western institutions 
(however, not in full) are created on a different cultural basis. The results of secondary 
modernization are diverse, and if some countries manage to break through to a new level of 
social development, then others for a long time “get stuck” in the intermediate state 
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between tradition and modernity, while both components undergo deformation. One of the 
results generated by such a situation is the neopatrimonial political regime. 
Neopatrimonialism is associated with the problems of “recurring culture”, archaization and 
traditionalism. 
The problem of the spread of conservative and archaic tendencies in Russian society 
has long attracted the attention of researchers. Most often, the problem of archaization is 
considered in the context of the analysis of Russian modernization - whether it is 
understood as catching up or as a specific Russian path to modernity. Conservatism and 
archaization appear as spontaneous reactions of society to modernization structural 
changes. One of the first to study the problem of archaization in relation to Russian society 
was A. Akhiezer (2006) In his opinion, Russian society has been functioning as a split one 
for many centuries of its history, regularly responding to the challenges of something new 
with structural complication of the reactions of simplification, and return to simpler models. 
In Russian sociology, the concept of periodic discharges of complexity and interruption of 
modernization was proposed by L. Gudkov [Gudkov, 2002]. 
As applied to economics, the problems of archaization were investigated, for 
example, by A. G. Vishnevsky in the concept of conservative modernization in the USSR 
[Vishnevsky, 1998]. The research of the specifics of the Russian national socio-economic 
and political model in the context of modernization and archaization of Russia is carried out 
by a team of authors led by K.V. Vodenko (Vodenko et al., 2017; Vodenko et al., 2018). 
In this article, we mainly focus on the political component of Russian archaization - 
in connection with the problem of patrimonial and neopatrimonial regimes; this problem is 
widely represented in the works of such authors as S. Eisenstadt [1999], R. Theobald 
[2007], Hale [2005], A. Fisun [Fisun, 2007], V. Gelman [Gelman, 2016] and others. The 
traditionalist settings of the political elites of Russia encouraged some scholars to talk about 
“exploding archaism,” for example, V. A. Achkasov [1997]. Much attention is paid to 
archaic clanism in Russian politics. For example, O. V. Kryshtanovskaya 
[Kryshtanovskaya, 2005], Afanasyev [Afanasyev, 2002] and others wrote about clanism. 
Archaic tendencies in Russian Orthodoxy were investigated by K. Kostyuk [Kostyuk, 
2002]. V. Fedotova [Fedotova, 2012] made a significant contribution to the analysis of the 
archaization problem. The concept of C.K. Lamazhaa [Lamazhaa, 2014] considers Russian 
archaization as an adaptive reaction to structural changes and explores it mainly on a 
regional example - on the example of archaization of the society of the Republic of Tyva in 
the post-Soviet period. 
In this article, we consider the tendency to conservatism and archaization as a 
dysfunctional reaction of the society, included in the process of catch-up modernization, to 
the changes generated by this process. 
The Results of the Study.  
The post-Soviet period demonstrates manifestations of archaization at various levels 
and in different segments of social space. We can find manifestation of archaism at the 
level of everyday, mundane existence, and at the level of politics. In general, we can even 
talk about the structural archaization of Russian society. In this article, we are interested in 
mainly conservative trends in the politics of the Russian state, which, on the one hand, are a 
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manifestation of a broader process of archaization, and on the other hand, they themselves 
can act as a factor enhancing archaization tendencies. 
To analyze the conservative trends in Russian politics, we turn to the specifics of 
changes in the state and its institutions during modernization, since it is the process of 
modernization that is the main force that brings to life deep structural and cultural 
transformations, which are followed by reactions of resistance from social groups and 
agents who do not have time to adapt to the dynamics of changes. In his concept of 
“cultural lag”, W. Ogborn noted that cultural development proceeds unevenly. Elements of 
material culture can change faster than elements of spiritual culture. The same can be said 
about structural change - rapid changes at the level of social structure, institutional structure 
can significantly outrun changes in the structure of public consciousness [Vaskov, et al., 
2018; Ponomarev, et al., 2019]. 
Such a situation arises, for example, when new institutions are created purposefully 
and in a short time, and are not the result of a long socio-cultural development. In this case, 
the newly created institutions can take hybrid forms. Such a hybrid is the modern Russian 
political regime. In addition to hybridity, the essence of which we will consider a little later, 
an important feature of this regime is the mismatch between its formal official side - and 
informal content. We turn, however, to the problems of state transformation in the course of 
modernization changes. 
Based on numerous studies of the classics of modern sociology - from Weber to 
Foucault and many other authors, one can distinguish such an element of state 
modernization and political activity as formalization (rationalization, bureaucratization). 
In the modern era, the state turns into a complex bureaucratic machine, the 
functioning of which is based on formal norms and rules adopted and changed in the 
framework of established formalized procedures. Within the framework of the formalized 
state machine, there is a clear distribution of functions; each segment of it, as well as each 
individual performs a clearly defined task. Formalization of the state means that elements 
of subjectivity, personal preferences and interests must be sequestered. This, in particular, 
is connected with the separation of management and ownership, power and property, which 
as Weber noted, underlies the activities of the modern bureaucracy. 
The formalized state machine operates not only based on formalized rules and 
procedures, but also on the basis of the use of information, expert knowledge about society. 
Weber noted that the basis of the rule of the bureaucracy is knowledge. Foucault in his 
studies showed how, in the course of modernization, the dynamics of knowledge generates 
new forms of power, implemented not so much using violence and coercion, but through 
various formalized disciplinary practices of control and supervision. These practices are not 
possible without research on what is subject to regulation and control. 
It would seem that these features of public administration are present in its current 
Russian model. However, as noted above, the Russian government is characterized by a 
mismatch between the external formal side and informal practices, while the formal side 
acts as a cover or backdrop for the informal ties that underlie the Russian governance 
model. As V. Gelman notes, “formal institutions that define the framework for exercising 
of power and management are a by-product of the distribution of resources within the 
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“vertical power” they matter as “the rules of the game” only to the extent that they 
contribute (or at least do not interfere ) rent extraction” [Gelman, 2016, 7]. 
Almost all independent researchers of the Russian political regime note the role of 
clan and client relations, the use of power as a resource for the realization of personal 
interests. Turning the state machine into a mechanism to ensure the interests of the political 
elite is not only a moral problem, but a return to obsolete, archaic management practices, 
when the task of the authorities was not so much to regulate public processes as to ensure 
their own interests by extracting society`s resources. For premature societies, this is a 
normal model of the relationship between government and society, but in modern 
conditions, it is obsolete and ineffective, it is an obstacle to social development. In Weber's 
terms, this type of domination is called patrimonial. Quite a few countries of the modern 
world have this form of political regime, and these are countries of catch-up modernization. 
"G. Heeger ascribes to patrimonialism the main integrative role in those new states in 
which the political center seeks to be organized around the section of "benefits" in the form 
of posts, economic assistance, loans, legal privileges, etc. Usually these benefits go to 
leaders of various groups and fractions, who transfer such resources to their followers to 
maintain their support. An example of this type of ties is particularly well visible in 
Morocco where political system is divided into a plurality of primordial groups and 
fractions of interest. However, like G. Roth, G. Heeger points out that the patrimonial 
model of elite integration is in no way limited by traditional regimes similar to the kingdom 
of Morocco. For G. Roth and G. Heeger, patrimonialism is characterized by bureaucracy, 
which is permeated by personal relationships of the client-type” [Theobald, 2007]. 
Many modern scholars, beginning with S. Eisenstadt, use the term 
“neopatrimonialism” since the Weber`s term is more often associated with traditional rather 
than modern societies, although Weber himself noted that elements of patrimonialism may 
also exist in modern societies. According to Eisenstadt, neopatrimonialism is formed as a 
result of the failure of modernization and combines the features of traditionalism and the 
modern state. At the same time, neopatrimonialism is not a transitional, but rather stable 
form of the political regime. 
The neopatrimonial synthesis of tradition (archaic) and modernity is changing modern 
institutions (elections, parliament, parties, etc.) that lose their original functions and acquire 
others. Thus, parties, instead of expressing the interests of voters, serving as intermediaries 
between the government and society and ensuring the change of power, turn into an 
appendage of the existing executive power, more interested in interacting with it than with 
voters. Elections in such systems are in the nature of a regime support ritual, their results 
are often falsified, and therefore elections in neopatrimonial regimes cannot ensure the 
legal change of head of state and the formation of a parliament bound by obligations to 
society. 
The following features are characteristic of neopatrimonial regimes: 
1) All political, economic and symbolic resources of power are concentrated in the 
hands of the political center, which closes access to them, as well as to the main resources 
of society, for all other groups; gaining access to significant resources is possible only as a 
result of agreements with government representatives. 
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2) The state has become the property of the political elite - representatives of state 
power, privatizing the performance of socially significant and managerial functions and 
institutions, which serve as a source of income for the elite. 
3) Modern political institutions serve as a “receptacle” for ethnic, regional, clan and 
family ties, which determine the way these institutions function. 
4) According to Eisenstadt and other researchers of this phenomenon, the most 
important characteristic sign of neopatrimonialism is clientelism. 
It should be noted that neopatrimonial regimes impede the formation of political 
nations, namely, modern states are national. The formation of nations is hindered by the 
lack of working institutions of political representation; therefore, the population cannot 
realize its political subjectivity and manifest itself as a political community. Neopatrimonial 
regimes do not form a single nation, but split society into a political minority - the 
beneficiaries of the current system, and the majority, completely alienated from the 
government and deprived of the opportunity to legally influence the politics and 
development of society. Instead of nations, neopatrimonialism conserves other types of 
communities - ethnic, territorial, clan-like, which also split the unity of society, as they 
focus on group rather than common interests and can realize them only by entering into 
informal interactions with the authorities. 
Neopatrimonial regimes, like any form of state power, need legitimation. Since the 
essence of neopatrimonialism is the fusion of traditional elements of social and political life 
with deformed modern ones and since neopatrimonial regimes are not interested in 
changes, they seek legitimacy based on the past, loyalty to which justifies the current state 
of affairs. 
The current political regime in Russia cannot be based on liberal ideology as the only 
system of ideological legitimation of a state of a modern type. At the same time, like any 
political regime, it seeks self-preservation. Hence, there is an inevitable bias towards 
conservatism. 
Conservatism, in contrast to liberalism, does not have a clear ideological core. 
Representing an ideologically designed protective attitude of consciousness associated with 
the rejection of change, conservatism is able to use any ideological material related to a 
positively understood past. The orientation to the past is already somewhat archaic in itself, 
since modern society is oriented toward the future, which is one of its characteristic 
features. Modern Russian conservatism is eclectic. It includes several components. Firstly, 
this is an idealized view of the Soviet past, secondly, an equally idealized view of the past 
imperial, thirdly, a set of ideas about the special Russian way or special Russian 
civilization, almost always associated with the recognition of the special role of Orthodoxy. 
The latter is inextricably linked with the new role that Orthodoxy plays in legitimizing the 
existing regime and more broadly - the socio-political order that was developed in the first 
decades of the twenty-first century. 
The increased role of religion and the use of religion for ideological purposes is also 
one of the manifestations of the archaization of Russian society. 
In Soviet society, religion occupied a marginal position, was virtually absent in public 
space, adherence to one religion or another could become a reason for social exclusion. It is 
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not surprising that most secular people, especially urban and educated people, might not 
have encountered religion at all in their biographical experience and, as a rule, did not have 
any knowledge on religion. The dominant ideology, claiming to be an all-encompassing 
interpretation of reality, did not allow worldview competitors alongside it. At the same 
time, this ideology formed a holistic picture of reality, which was difficult to go beyond in 
an informationally closed society. 
The collapse of the Soviet model of reality and Soviet ideology caused a deep 
ideological and value crisis, the loss of ideas about the goals and meaning of not only 
individual existence, but also of society as a whole. One of the results of this was the search 
for a new worldview, which almost inevitably caused an increase in interest in religion, first 
of all, religions dominating historically on the territory of Russia - Orthodox Christianity 
and Islam. Since Islam is professed by a minority localized in a certain region, Orthodoxy 
is more suitable for the role of a nationwide "ideologized" religion. The majority of 
Russians identify themselves as Orthodox, although faith is almost never reflected in their 
behavior. Nevertheless, during the post-Soviet period, the influence of the Russian 
Orthodox Church constantly increased, not so much due to an increase in the number of 
believers, but due to increased contacts with the government and the use of its resources 
and mechanisms to protect the interests of the Church as a corporation. 
Ideologemes professed by many official representatives of the church are consonant 
with the conservative vector of state ideological policy with its inherent opposition to 
liberal values and “Western influence”, emphasis on Russian cultural specificity explaining 
the supposedly existing model of the political regime, appeal to “traditional values”, and 
conviction of a special mission of Russia in the world. None of the ideologemes listed has a 
clear meaningful content, but they construct a certain discourse, the constant reproduction 
of which through the media creates the effect of persuasiveness, especially since the public 
space for expressing other points of view is constantly narrowing. Internet appeared to be 
almost the last refuge of public, albeit very quantitatively limited discussions, which 
provokes new attempts by the authorities to control it. 
In an ideological vacuum and limited space for public discussion of philosophical 
problems, the role of the Russian Orthodox Church is constantly increasing. The Russian 
Orthodox Church works closely with law enforcement agencies - the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and the Ministry of Emergencies. The Church interacts rather closely with the 
armed forces, although a full-fledged institute of military chaplains did not arise in Russia, 
which is rather strange in the general context of the benevolence of the authorities and the 
Church and their constant cooperation. 
The Orthodox Church is regarded as an institution capable of maintaining stability in 
society and moral values associated with the traditions of Russian culture. The Church from 
its side considers itself as the guardian of morality and traditional values. This is natural for 
a religious organization, but modern societies cannot be guided by religious morality, 
which, being formed in the distant past, does not meet the realities of modernity. This 
discrepancy is most pronounced in the field of family protection. Protecting the idealized 
“traditional family”, (the meaning of the phrase is by no means unambiguous), Church 
representatives almost completely ignore the changed position of women in modern 
society, social factors that naturally lead to a decrease in the number of children in the 
family, etc. Receiving the unspoken support of the authorities, Church representatives often 
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publicize points of view, which cannot be called anything but obscurantist. This applies not 
only to family matters, but also to other issues - for example, Archpriest Dimitry Smirnov, 
a prominent public representative of the Russian Orthodox Church, has repeatedly stated 
publicly that “AIDS does not exist”, therefore it is not necessary to treat it. Moreover, the 
epidemic of this disease is officially registered in Russia, and ignoring the fact of the 
disease leads not only to the death of the patient himself, but also to the spread of the 
disease. Therefore, the public activity of some religious speakers directly harms society. 
Examples of the growing influence of religion on the life of Russians is the 
introduction of a number of courses (“Fundamentals and Values of Orthodoxy”, 
“Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture”, “Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture and Morality”, 
“Church History”) in secondary school. However, more important is the fact of the 
demonstrative commitment of representatives of political power to Orthodoxy, their 
participation in religious rites, broadcast by state media. The growing influence of religion 
on everyday consciousness was reflected in the content of materials published in 
periodicals. Church hierarchs often speak out on pressing social and political issues; their 
opinions are taken into account and regarded as significant. 
The Russian Orthodox Church is notably active in public space. Its official 
representatives often make statements about the leading role of Orthodoxy in the formation 
of Russian culture and national identity of Russians, the need to strengthen the foundations 
of statehood, increase fertility, the importance of patriotism and other issues not directly 
related to religion. The official documents adopted by the Russian Orthodox Church, for 
example, “Fundamentals of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church”, 
“Fundamentals of the Teachings of the Russian Orthodox Church on Dignity, Freedom and 
Human Rights”, as well as public speeches by the Patriarch and other representatives of the 
Church contain significant political and ideological components. Created under the 
auspices of the Church, the public structure “The World Russian National Council” was 
directly intended for the interaction of the Church, believers with various political forces. 
This Council, claiming to be representative of the Orthodox, adopted a number of 
documents relating to purely secular issues. 
Thus, in 2011, the XV World Russian People’s Council developed a version of the 
“basic values” of Russian society. In 2014, the XVIII World Russian National Council 
adopted the “Declaration of Russian Identity”. Thereby, representatives of a separate 
confession claim to form a system of values and collective identity for society as a whole, 
despite the fact that Russian society remains secular - one of the most secular in the world. 
A very popular topic of public statements by representatives of the Russian Orthodox 
Church is the criticism of liberal values and the need to confront harmful external 
influences, that is, the rhetoric of cultural isolationism and the rejection of universalist 
modern values, in particular human rights. All this justifies the anti-liberal course of 
modern Russian political regime, which sees itself as the successor of "centuries-old 
traditions of the Russian state", for which the interaction with the Church was normal. 
However, this ignores what this interaction led to - the loss of all independence by the 
Church, and, ultimately, its catastrophic position in the Soviet period, the change of which 
was connected precisely with liberal values, which are so actively criticized today by the 
authorities and the Church. 
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A number of Russian researchers have already noted the futility and fundamental 
impossibility of restoring the Orthodox identity that cannot fulfill a civilizational-forming 
role in modern society [Akhiezer et al., 2008, 418] 
Archaization is manifested today not only in the fact of turning to religion, since 
religion is a dynamic phenomenon that can exist in modern societies, adapting to its 
realities. However, speaking about modern Russian Orthodoxy, one can note the growing 
archaization of this religiosity itself. For most modern believers, religiosity boils down to 
ritualism - i.e. magical practices, not including a practically conscious approach to faith, 
religious reflection. Reflexivity and attempts at a conscious approach to both faith and the 
role of the Church are generally not welcomed by the modern leadership of the Russian 
Orthodox Church. This is related to recurring conflicts with the intellectuals of the Church - 
both secular and religious. 
In addition to enhancing the influence of Orthodoxy, other archaic tendencies 
associated with religion are emerging in Russian society. Russia is a multicultural and 
multiconfessional country. In different regions, archaization processes have their own 
specifics. In particular, in Russia, there are regions with a compactly living Muslim 
population, and in the post-Soviet period, the influence of Islam on the lifestyle in such 
regions is constantly increasing. 
Thus, Ch. Lamazhaa notes, “In the North Caucasus, a model of social living 
arrangement is trying to assert a widely revived Islamic cultural system. For example, a 
characteristic phenomenon in some regions of Dagestan, mainly mountainous, was the 
restriction, sometimes a complete rejection of general education for girls, due to the high 
degree of religiosity and the priority of Muslim cultural values. Dagestanis with a high 
degree of Islamic identification condemn the joint education of children of both sexes and 
interpret the modern system of general education as not being in accordance with Islamic 
standards. The spread of the practice of polygamy in the region also refers to the influence 
of the religious factor” [Lamazhaa, 2014, 358]. The almost complete Islamization of life in 
the Chechen Republic is a well-known fact. Islamization is less widespread in regions with 
a mixed population, but even there this tendency is very noticeable. 
In the regions of Russia that have retained elements of traditional folk beliefs, there is 
a tendency for the revival of shamanism, while in the revived shamanism the memory of 
the past is intertwined with innovative practices, that is, in this case we are talking not only 
about rebirth, but also about construction, the combination of archaic and modernity. 
Shamanism turns into one of the significant elements of collective and regional identity; 
therefore, we can say that in this case, as in the case of Orthodoxy and Islam, religion takes 
on secular ideological functions. 
In addition to paganism, which has some support in folk memory and even elements 
of preserved rituals (shamanism), such a phenomenon as neopaganism is observed in 
Russian society. The most noticeable is its segment, which is associated with attempts to 
reconstruct the Slavic tradition. In terms of content, Slavic neopaganism is a bizarre 
mixture of remnants of knowledge about Slavic beliefs gleaned from scientific and 
pseudoscientific works, fantasies of the neopagans themselves and often various conspiracy 
theories. This diverse and constantly changing content, is not so much curious as the anti-
modern vector expressed in it, as well as the attempts of neopagans to form an alternative 
collective identity, built not on the recognition of Orthodoxy as the core of Russian culture, 
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but on a rather aggressive rejection of Orthodoxy as a “foreign faith” imposed on the Slavs 
by external forces and knocked them off the historical path. 
Neopaganism is associated with a revival of belief into magic, and in this regard, it is 
part of a wider wave of revival of magism and occultism in various forms, which has swept 
Russian society and is often encouraged by state-run media. Psychics and sorcerers have 
become a familiar part of the Russian media landscape, but also the everyday life of 
Russians, because they formed a specific “professional” group, whose activity is mainly 
commercial in nature. It is explained by the demand for magical practices and the 
willingness of Russians to pay for them. It is interesting that many “notable” or aspiring to 
fame occult figures as well as representatives of “traditional religions” tend to declare their 
allegiance to power. A typical comic example of such behavior is the recent “prayer 
service” conducted by some “Russian witches” to support President Putin. However, a 
more alarming trend is the influence of the occult on a certain segment of the Russian 
political elite. 
The examples of archaization of Russian society, discussed above, indicate that the 
conservative orientations of the Russian political elite are not only the result of a pragmatic 
choice, but a manifestation of some trends in the dynamics of public consciousness, which 
to one extent or another affects all social groups. The conservatism of the political elite acts 
as a consequence of these trends, but at the same time, a factor in their strengthening and 
spread, since this is in the interests of the political elite. As noted in the introductory part of 
the article, archaic tendencies can be considered as a result of failures in modernization, as 
a defensive reaction to structural transformations. 
Some researchers, in particular, C. Lamazhaa, see this as an adaptation mechanism, 
that is, they tend to reveal something functional in archaization. From our point of view, 
Russian archaization is rather dysfunctional, since it affects not only some particular 
aspects of life, but also such a system-forming element of society as the political regime. 
The conservative orientation of this regime blocks the development of society and is a 
brake on the path of further modernization changes, without offering any real alternatives to 
modern society, except for maintaining the existing model of neopatrimonialism with its 
deformed pseudo-modern institutions, presented as a special model of statehood. 
Conclusion.  
The political regime that has been formed in Russia is characterized by many modern 
scholars as neopatrimonial. This type of regime is not unique - similar regimes arise in the 
course of modernization of unsuccessful changes and have a hybrid character, combining 
elements of traditionalism and modernity. At the same time, modern political institutions 
are inevitably deformed. 
The essence of neopatrimonial regimes boils down to the fact that the political elite 
concentrates in their hands all the significant resources of society, restricts access to them 
of other social groups and blocks any legal attempts to change the government and legal 
political participation of the population, as well as its independent civic activity. 
Obstructing modern forms of political activity and political governance, neopatrimonial 
regimes need ideological legitimation, which inevitably tends to conservatism, which 
justifies the current situation with references to tradition and rejects any attempts of 
changes in which the political elite is not interested. The emergence of the neopatrimonial 
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regime in Russia is not a prerequisite, but a consequence of conservative and archaic 
tendencies in public consciousness. However, having been formed this regime contributes 
to the strengthening and conservation of these trends, thereby blocking the process of 
modernization of society. 
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